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Trends and Prospects
This inquiry into government capital requirements has departed from
the general plan for the broad study of capital formation and financing of
which it is a part because of the distinctive characteristics of the economic
sector with which it deals. We have been primarily concerned with the
financial capital requirements of governments.
We have, with one exception noted below, taken those requirements to
be the funds governments have actually raised, not the funds they re-
quired (in the sense ofjustifiably required).
In summarizing our findings it will be convenient first to restate some
distinctions that we have found it important to insist on, next to recapitu-
late what seem to be the main trends in state and local financing, and
then to review our analysis of federal financing. Finally we will attempt
to draw some inferences from our findings that we consider pertinent for
an appraisal of the prospects for future government financial requirements.
1. Some Basic Distinctions
Particularly for the federal government since World War I it is urgent
to distinguish and to have in mind the difference between the budget
deficit and what we have called the nonfinancial deficit. The concept of
the federal budget surplus or deficit is, of course, the one that receives
primary attention in the budget document and in Treasury financial
reports. It has been gradually developed since the passage of the Budget
and Accounting Act (1921), and especially since the 1930's by a process
of study and experiment to serve broadly the purposes of legislative control
in levying taxes and in making appropriations and the purposes of
administrative management. Hence budget receipts and expenditures do
not include the receipts and expenditures of federal trust funds (except
that, in the case of transactions between general government funds and
trust funds, the trust account receipts appear as budget expenditures, the
trust account expenditures as budget receipts).
The deficit computation with which we have been principally con-
cerned is not the budget deficit but one which is designed to serve another
fiscal policy objective—the objective of economic stabilization. It is also
especially appropriate as a measure of federal financial requirements. It is
the excess of the nonfinancial uses of funds over the nonfinancial sources
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shown for the federal government in the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds
compilations—or the excessfinancial sources over financial uses.'
Nonfinancial receipts and in contrast to budget receipts and
expenditures, include both trust account transactions and general govern-
ment transactions with the public (but not transactions between one
government fund and another).
In addition to trust account operations there is another main category
of nonfinancial transactions that are not classed as budget receipts and
expenditures. These consist of certain transactions of government cor-
porations and other business-type and lending activities. Just how to draw
the line between the inside-the-budget and the. outside-the-budget trans-
actions of these federal agencies has proven a difficult problem. The
solution adopted in 1951 has the effect of treating net funds provided each
such corporation or activity by the rest of the government during the year
as a net budget expenditure.2
Not only are there important categories of nonfinancial transactions
in the FOF compilations that do not count as budget receipts and ex-
penditures; there are also budget transactions of a financial nature that
do not count as nonfinancial receipts and expenditures. These consist
chiefly of budget expenditures for acquiring loans and securities and budget
receipts from the sale or redemption of the loans and securities in govern-
ment agency portfolios.
As a result of all the various differences in transactions included and
excluded, there can be a substantial budget deficit when there is a non-
financial surplus. In 1946 there was a budget deficit of $2.5 billion; a
nonfinancial surplus of $5.0 billion.
Before the considerable expansion of federal functions and agencies
that took place in the 1930's, budget receipts and expenditures were not
distinguished from other federal agency transactions. Total expenditures
minus total receipts equaled the increment in federal debt minus the
increment in the general fund balance.3 Of course this is not true today
of budget expenditures and receipts alone; balancing Treasury financial
I Flow of Funds in the United States, 1939—53. Figures for more recent years have been
published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin as they have become available.
There are two other deficit computations that are useful for the fiscal objective of
economic stabilization: (a) One is the deficit in the account for the federal government
in the National Income and Product Accounts. (b) The other, in the compilation of
which the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget cooperate, has had various
names. We refer to it here as net cash operating outgo. For our present purpose the FOF
nonfinancial deficit is distinctly better than either of these. It spells out financial details
as (a) does not. It consistently identifies all financial transactions as financial while (b)
does not and it provides more clean-cut detail by object of expenditure.
2 Technically the language here used applies to the way the Post Office is treated
in the budget accounts. But in many respects the Post Office continues to be treated as a
part of the general government rather than as a business-type activity.
8 Except for a technical float discrepancy.
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statements include figures on the transactions of trust and other accounts
too.
When we speak of the financial requirement of a government during a
particular period we mean (unless otherwise indicated) the excess of its
nonfinancial expenditures over its nonfinancial receipts. This is equal to
the increment in its net debt,4 where by net debt we mean the excess of its
outstanding debt over its total financial assets. These financial assets
Consist mainly of its cash balance and the loans and securities it holds.
In the case of the federal government we have included in the minuend of
this net debt computation, in addition to the direct debt, the bonds, notes,
and debentures of and the privately held proprietary interest in govern-
ment corporations, government accounts payable, and certain government
trust and deposit liabilities.5 Federal financial assets other than the general
fund balance are held chiefly by the Old Age and Survivors Insurance
Fund and other social insurance funds and by credit agencies like the
Commodity Credit Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. Both social
insurance funds and federal credit started in the 1930's on a period of
rapid.growth. The assets of the social insurance funds—these are almost
entirely government bonds—increased from around $0.5 billion in 1929
to practically $45 billion in 1954. Federal credit increased during this
period from $1.7 billion to $28.2 billion.6 Mainly because of these two
developments, gross direct debt less the general fund balance exceeded
net debt by some $73 billion as of December 31, 1954. It has become very
important when speaking of federal debt to say whether one means gross
debt outstanding, debt held by the public (i.e. by holders other than
federal agencies), or net debt.
What has been said about federal finances applies on the whole also
to the finances of state and local governments. The distinction between
the budget surplus or deficit and the nonfinancial surplus or deficit is much
the same. Current Bureau of the Census compilations of government
financial data use the terminology "general revenues and expenditures"
instead of"budget receipts and expenditures," and they report in addition
to these the transactions of government enterprises and social insurance
trust funds. The Federal Reserve Flow of Funds compilations include a
statement of state and local nonfinancial receipts and expenditures and
financial sources and uses of funds.
The parallel to federal finance goes farther. With the rapid growth of
their financial assets in recent years the distinction between gross state
There can be a technical discrepancy in this equation too.
But not insurance policy reserves or state balances in the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Fund.
6AsofJune 30. The figures on federal credit do not include World War I international
debts to the United States. They do include small amounts of veterans' loans also included
in the social insurance funds.
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and local debt, debt net of sinking funds, and net debt has become
extremely important. In addition to sinking funds and social insurance trust
funds, there have come to be substantial endowment and investment funds.
Total cash and security holdings of state and local governments were
$7.4 billion at the close of their 1937 fiscal years; $38.0 billion nineteen
years later.7 General expenditures exceeded general revenues in the 1956
fiscal year compilation by $3.0 billion; the 1956 calendar year nonfinan-
cial deficit is estimated at $2.5 billion.8
2. The Record of State and Local Financial Requirements
It will be convenient to summarize our findings regarding state and
local financial requirements under the following six headings: (a) geo-
graphical debt patterns, (b) construction indebtedness, (c) orderly and
disorderly finance, (d) financing by different units of government, (e)
emergency borrowing, and (f) the general trend.
a. Geographical debt patterns. The borrowing practices of com-
munities of different size have been sufficiently distinctive so that there
has been at least until quite recently a very striking pattern of per capita
local government indebtedness. Likewise there has been a somewhat
definite, though gradually changing, regional pattern of per capita
indebtedness.
In general the tendency has been for per capita gross debts to vary
with community size—the larger the community, the larger the per capita
debt. It is true the rapid growth of the financial assets of some of the
larger cities during the last few years has made the net debt pattern for
cities of more than 25,000 inhabitants a distinctly irregular one and even
impaired the regularity of the gross debt pattern. But the tendency of per
capita debts to decrease with community size is still clearly discernible.
The available information on the trends of per capita debts by com-
munity size is mostly on a gross basis. The growth of per capita gross debts
in the smaller communities has shown a tendency to catch up with the
growth in the larger cities. We think this catching-up process likely to
continue, particularly if rural communities continue to acquire more
urban characteristics. But the recently developed irregularities in the
community size pattern raise the question whether uniformity on a net
basis may not eventually be achieved by a leveling-down rather than a
leveling-up process.
Regional differences in per capita state and local debts (gross debts
less sinking fund assets), 1890—1942, have reflected a very rough correla-.
tion with per capita incomes. Between 1890 and 1922—the impact of the
This figure does not include the Unemployment Compensation Fund.
BSeeBureau of the Census, Summary of Government Finances in 1956, Tables 1 and 6,
and October 1957 Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. 1192.
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industrial revolution on state and local government capital outlay seems
to have been particularly strong during this interval—these regional
differences widened. But the longer-term trend of 1890—1942 seems to have
been toward narrowing them. In large part this trend was probably due
to the growth of cities in regions that were relatively little urbanized in 1890.
b. Construction indebtedness. Most state and local long-term debts
can be identified by purpose of issue, and the purposes that account for
the bulk of these debts are capital formation financing purposes. Further,
most of the capital outlays—and the only capital outlays on which a
reasonably satisfactory statistical time series is available—are construction
outlays. Still the relation between construction expenditures and financial
capital requirements is not a very close one. The ratio of the aggregate
nonfinancial deficit for state and local governments to their new con-
struction expenditures (excluding expenditures financed by federal aid)
is extremely variable. On an annual basis in 1929—52 it varies between
about 2:5 in 1950 and about —6:1 in 1944 (the 6 is negative because there
was a surplus in 1944). Even on a quinquennial basis this aggregative ratio
is highly erratic. The quinquennial ratio of new long-term debt issues to
new construction is a good deal more stable. It varies between 45 and 77
per cent for 1915—53.
The volume of new security issues reflects new construction expendi-
tures somewhat more closely than do the increments in net indebtedness.
No doubt this is partly because nonfinancial surpluses can be used to
finance debt retirements. But perhaps a more important consideration is
that differences between the net surplus or deficit and the volume of
securities issued are in considerable measure absorbed by changes in cash
balances, in short-term debts, and in sinking fund assets.
Since state and local public buildings and other public works are in
substantial part financed by borrowing, we might expect a somewhat
stable relation between the investments in such structures and the debts
they have occasioned. There are three categories of public capital assets
and of debts specifically incurred to finance them for which it is possible
roughly to determine what has been happening in recent years to the ratio
of debt to depreciated value: highways, school buildings, and enterprise
structures. These ratios both for highways and for schools show marked
variations reflecting both changes in the financial condition of govern-
ments and the growing importance of federal and state grants-in-aid.
Since accrual accounting conventions presumably exert more influence
in the case of capital formation by public enterprises than in other state
and local capital outlays, one might have expected more stability in the
debt to value ratio for enterprise structures (including sewage systems,
for these cannot readily be separated out). The expectation does not
appear to be well founded.
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c. Orderly and disorderly finance. In general we have not inquired
whether the borrowings governments have engaged in have been justified.
But it has seemed necessary to note that there have from time to time been
various instances of clearly unjustified deficits and thoroughly disorderly
finance. And in some of these there has been outright corruption. Among
the most extreme instances of disorderly finance during the last fifty
or sixty years are those that accompanied the Florida land boom of the
1920's; and the Coral Gables case stands out as one that was clearly
characterized by corruption.
From time to time there have been instances of disorderly finance; but
on the whole there has been a definite tendency toward greater orderliness.
Indeed, there have been very substantial improvements in fiscal and other
administrative procedures; and the quality of the personnel responsible
for financial administration at all levels of government has been raised to a
point that warrants saying public financial administration seems in process
of becoming a profession.
One aspect of improved fiscal procedures is improvements in govern-
ment accounting. Perhaps it is reasonable to look forward to future pro-
gress in accrual accounting for state and local enterprises—conceivably
even for general government—that will make the connection between new
capital expenditures and the increment in net debt more like that in the
field of private business.
d. Financing by different units of government. During the nineteenth
century disorderly state finance, especially during, the 1830's and in the
South after the Civil War, led first to serious financial distress and then to
measures designed to prevent its recurrence. These measures in general
took the form of constitutional restrictions on state borrowing. State
borrowing during the first fifty years of the nineteenth century had
apparently been a great deal more important quantitatively than bor-
rowing by local government units. One unintended result of the constitu-
tional restrictions was that local debts grew so rapidly during the second
half of the century that by 1902 they were seven-eighths of the total.9 And
municipal debts alone were such a large fraction of this total—nearly
three-quarters—that "municipal bonds" became a synonym for all state
and local obligations.
With the rapid growth of local government borrowing came instances
of disorderly local government finance. Many of these were followed by
financial distress, particularly after the crisis of 1873; and again there
followed measures to restrict borrowing, this time the borrowing of local
governments. Some of these restrictions were written into state consti-
tutions, some were incorporated in state statutes, and some in municipal
charters.
That is, of total gross state and local debt less sinking fund assets.
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The special district is, among other things, a device for considerably
relaxing restrictions on borrowing power. It also serves to relax other
restrictions, notably restrictions on taxing power. And it serves as a means
of realizing the main advantages of consolidating specific functions of local
government units—schools, water supply, sewage and fire protection
systems, ownership of levees, bridges, toll highways, etc.—while avoiding
the various serious political and legal obstacles to outright consolidation of
the municipalities or other units involved. It is little wonder that school
and other special districts, though of almost negligible importance at the
turn of the century, have come to account for nearly a third of the total
indebtedness of all local governments and about two-thirds of the long-
term school debt as of 1951.
If the special district makes it possible to realize important economies
of large-scale operation without outright consolidation of the local units
involved—even when the units are in different states—it has also made
possible a great deal of small-scale operation. Of the nearly 114,000 local
government units in the United States in 1952, school and other special
districts accounted for almost 80,000. Still there was a substantial amount
of consolidation during the two preceding decades; the number of school
districts was reduced by almost 50 per cent.
Economies in borrowing and in collecting taxes are among the signi-
ficant econon'iies resulting from large-scale operation. The past forty or
more years have seen the development of another device for realizing this
kind of economy—the grant-in-aid. No doubt the advantages of borrowing
and taxing on a larger scale have contributed significantly to the growth
of both federal and state aid programs. Another factor, more important
in the case of federal than of state programs, is that the grant-in-aid has
proven a convenient way to promote standards in the performance of
functions by the aid-receiving governments and to decrease inequalities
in performance among them. In 1950 federal aid to states represented some
17 per cent of state nonfinancial receipts,'° while state aid to local govern-
ments amounted to about two-ninths of local government nonfinancial
receipts." Aid seems to have been a smaller proportion of the receipts of
the larger cities than of other local units ever since the start of state pro-
grams. Federal aid has tended in a general way to be a larger proportion
of state revenue in those states where per capita personal incomes are
relatively low.
e. Emergency borrowing. Most, but not quite all, long-term debts of
state and local governments have been incurred to finance capital outlays.
Non-capital-formation borrowing has in general been occasioned by
10Statewithdrawals from the Unemployment Compensation Fund are excluded
from both numerator and denominator of this ratio.
11Thiscomputation includes state-collected, locally shared taxes.
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various emergencies. There was borrowing after both world wars to
finance veterans' benefits. There was borrowing during the 1930's made
necessary by the depression. Also there has been some borrowing—a quite
small amount in the aggregate—in connection with floods, hurricanes,
and other disasters.
Table 8 gives total nonfinancial receipts and expenditures of state
and local governments and the aggregate net deficit. The deficit does not
show any clearly cyclical variation except during the 1930's. Before this
decade the property tax provided so large a part of total nonfinancial
receipts that it is not surprising these receipts were cyclically quite insen-
sitive. And while for states cyclically sensitive taxes have since become
important, their influence on the total of nonfinancial receipts was not
sufficient in 1949 and 1954 to make these two stand out as recession years
in Table 8. Even if state and local governments assume no further re-
sponsibilities for countercyclical fiscal operations than they have to date,
increasing reliance on cyclically sensitive taxes may conceivably involve
them in recession deficits in future.
f. The general trend. It is tempting to say that there has been a
long-term upward trend not only in state and local total debt but also in
debt per capita. We think the most significant question in regard to trend
relates to net debt, and particularly for this basis it is difficult to be definite
about the trend on either an aggregate or a per capita basis.
From the 1890's to 1930 certainly both trends were markedly upward.
The immediate response of state and local governments to the industrial
revolution was a vast increase in expenditures, both capital and current.
And with their total expenditures growing somewhat more rapidly than
total gross national product, state and local governments had extensive
recourse to borrowing.
During the great depression of the 1930's, borrowing was difficult;
pressure for small and balanced budgets was strong; and after 1933 federal
aid helped to finance a moderate increase in expenditures. There was little
increase in net debt during the decade.
Then during the war receipts grew; expenditure increases were re-
strained. By 1945 aggregate net debt was reduced to a negligible amount.
And at the end of 1954 it was only $6.5 billion, about what it had been
thirty-four years earlier.
3. The Record of Federal Financial Requirements
In times past there have been federal debt issues identified as serving
to finance particular capital expenditures, like the issue of bonds that
helped finance the purchase and construction of the Panama Canal. But
there have been no such issues since the -1930's. As of December 31, 1954,
more than 90 per cent of the federal net debt had been incurred during war
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emergencies and practically all the rest of it had resulted from the contra-
cyclical nonfinancial deficits of the 1930's. No doubt both the war ex-
penditures and the depression expenditures that were financed in part by
these debts include physical capital formation outlays. But obviously this
is not the main fact about the debts. The main fact is that they were in-
curred during emergencies to finance very rapid increases in expenditures
on a wide variety of objects.
The proportion of expenditures that were deficit financed was smaller
during the Civil War than during the War of 1812,12 smaller during
World War I than during the Civil War, and smaller still—though more
than half—during World War II. This general downward trend reflects
in part improved fiscal procedures.
But, if the United States were to have another major war-financing
problem to deal with, and if there were to be, as there was not during
either world war, a firm administration policy of pay-as-you-go.in which
Congress acquiesced, there would still be difficulties in fiscal procedures
that would make it unlikely such a policy could be fully realized. In
particular there is the difficulty that while Congress has shown a willing-
ness during an emergency to relax its control over appropriations so as
to expedite the legislative process, it has not been willing to expedite the
process of handling revenue bills. Conceivably this kind of legislative pro-
cess could be expedited by putting tax rate changes and tax base changes
in separate bills; or, if Congress were prepared to accept a more radical
approach, the need for legislative speed could be diminished by formula-
flexibility taxation.
The international aid extended during and after World War I and
during World War II added to the emergency expenditure totals that were
financed in part by borrowing. Aid can be expected to involve recourse to
borrowing when it contributes to a sharp increase in expenditures; and so
far as the borrowing is concerned, it makes no difference whether the aid
takes the form of grants and adds to the nonfinancial deficit, or the form of
loans that add to the federal portfolio of financial assets. But an aid program
that is not too unevenly distributed over a period of years, as has been the
case in the years following World War II, need not occasion borrowing.
The federal government has gradually come to assume some measure
of responsibility for "recovery and relief" in connection with business
recessions, even for maintaining a high and stable level of employment.
The degree to which such a responsibility is recognized seems itself to be
inversely correlated with the cycle, but there has been a definite trend
toward making the responsibility broader and more categorical.
During the 1930's federal recovery and relief activities took a wide
variety of forms. There were moves that were largely of a noncyclical
12Thisstatement does not include the deficit financing of the Confederacy.
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character, principally some of the financial reforms, labor relations and
labor standards legislation, and the establishment of an old age insurance
system and three broad special public assistance programs. There were
moves allegedly relevant to promoting economic recovery whose effective-
ness was questionable: monetary nostrums including a plan for varying
the price of gold, autarchic measures designed to encourage a more
favorable trade balance, and organizational arrangements for price and
wage maintenance.
The principal measures and programs that were really pertinent to the
objectives of recovery, relief, and economic stabilization were: the steps
taken to bolster up the economy's credit structure and to relieve the
distress of defaulting debtors by assuming their debts; direct and work
relief programs for the unemployed and special benefits to veterans and
farmers; increased public construction; and increased grants-in-aid to
state and local governments. To the extent that these measures and pro-
grams meant additions to federal purchases of gross national product or
transfer payments to state and local governments and to individuals which
added to the funds they had available for national product purchases, they
provided a fiscal countercyclical bolstering of aggregate demand. But
fiscal policy vacillated between the objective of an annually balanced
budget and the objective of an effective countercycle, even though there
was, on the whole, somewhat greater emphasis on the latter.
In three minor recessions since World War II the chief federal counter-
cyclical activities and developments have been: countercyclical easing and
tightening of Federal Reserve credit (but until 1951 Federal Reserve
obligations to maintain government bond prices largely precluded an
effective tight credit policy); the easing of housing credit underwriting
terms, particularly in 1954; the operations of the Commodity Credit
Corporation, particularly in 1948—49 and 1953—54; the "built-in" increases
and decreases in the volume of unemployment compensation benefits;
tax cuts effective in 1949 and 1954; and an increase in national security
expenditures in 1949. The national security expenditure increase and, in
large measure, the tax cuts may be characterized as not intended counter-
cyclically.
During the decade of the 1930's federal net debt increased by. about
$16.0 billion. In 1949 the federal government had a nonfinancial surplus
of $0.5 billion; in the previous year a surplus of almost $10.0 billion.
There was a nonfinancial deficit of $4.8 billion during the five quarters
ending September 30, 1954, but less than $2.0 billion of this can be
definitely attributed to the 1953—54 recession. During the two years
ending June 30, 1959, there was a nonfinancial deficit of $11 billion; this
compares with a surplus of $11 billion during the two years ending Decem-
ber 31, 1956.
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4. A Postscript on Prospects
The expenditures that have been responsible for most government
borrowing in the past—wars, recessions and depressions, and state and
local capital formation—will probably continue to be responsible for most
borrowing in the future.
What can be said about the prospects for state and local capital forma-
tion requirements is quite limited. We may note first five conditions to
which it seems likely the total volume of this kind of financing will con-
form. None of them gives a clear-cut clue regarding the total volume.
One of these relates to community-size and regional debt patterns.
It seems reasonable to look forward, though perhaps some time forward,
to a gradual trend toward greater uniformity in per capita debts both
regionally and by size of community. Whether this will mean a leveling-up
process, and a consequent upward trend in net debt, or a leveling-down
will depend somewhat on the growth of government financial assets.
The second condition relates to the development of more businesslike
accounting and budgetary procedures for government enterprises. It is
reasonable to expect that such developments will gradually make the
relation between enterprise debt and depreciated value of enterprise
assets more like the corresponding relation for nonfinancial private
enterprises. Conceivably, too, capital budgeting will develop in a way
that will give something of a push in this direction for general government
debts and capital investments.
The third condition also relates to the trend toward improvements in
the fiscal procedures. This condition involves short-term debt and other
elements in liquidity position. The proportion of short-term borrowing
that is budget borrowing can quite possibly be expected to increase. More
generally, variations in the liquidity position of the individual government
unit can be expected, as time goes on, to be dominated more by short-term
influences—differences in the seasonal pattern of nonfinancial receipts
and expenditures and other differences that are purely temporary,
particularly differences between the time pattern of receipts from long-
term debt issued to finance a capital outlay and the time pattern of the
capital outlay.
The fourth condition relates to taxation. It seems likely that the tax
exemption which state and municipal bonds have enjoyed heretofore
will continue to constitute an encouragement to such financing.
The fifth condition involves the purposes of borrowing. In the past
a major fraction of long-term indebtedness has been incurred to finance
road and school construction projects. But in recent years a considerable
part of such capital expenditures has been financed by federal and state
grants-in-aid and as a consequence put on more or less a pay-as-you-go
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basis. Any forecast of future state and local borrowing must therefore take
account of the extent to which the further development of grant-in-aid
programs may obviate the need for bond flotation financing.
But subject to these conditions, what is the prospect for a definite
upward trend in the per capita state and local government indebtedness
incurred to finance capital outlays? The upward trend from the 1890's
to 1930 was interrupted first by the depression, then by World War II.
However, there would seem to be no reason to think that these interrup-
tions are permanent, no reason to suppose that they have permanently
reduced the proportion of capital expenditures likely to be financed by
borrowing. Still that proportion has been a decidedly variable one in the
past. And if one tries to list considerations one should take into account in
attempting to project it into the future, two such considerations stand out
in our analysis. The proportion of debt-financed capital outlays seems to
reflect the ratio of the rate of growth of government expenditures to the rate
of growth of gross national product. A high ratio makes for a high pro-
portion. And the proportion can be expected to be smaller to the extent
that the capital expenditures are financed by federal—and perhaps also
by state—grants-in-aid.
We can be a little more definite about the considerations one should
take into account in appraising the prospects for government borrowing
in connection with business recessions and depressions.
The effect of the 1929—33 recession on the aggregate deficit of state
and local governments shows clearly in Table 8. Apparently the effects in
1949 and 1954 were quite minor. If one asks about the likelihood that some
future recession may entail a considerable increase in state and local net
debt, there are two main considerations to be taken into account, one
that tends to increase the likelihood of such a development, the other
working in the opposite direction. We have attributed the fact that there
is so little evidence of the cycle in Table 8 largely to the insensitivity of
the major tax source to most business fluctuations. But sensitive sources
have been becoming relatively more important, and if this trend continues,
as it probably will, it will make a future depression deficit more likely.
However, the other consideration may at least in the longer run prove
to be overriding. During the 1930's the federal government came to
assume practicalLy the whole depression deficit burden. True, it has taken
no steps since then that would more fully eliminate cyclical variations
in state and local receipts. But the unemployment insurance system means
that state payments into the Unemployment Compensation Fund are
large when times are good and that state withdrawals are large when
unemployment is high. We think it not unlikely that other intergovern-
ment flows of funds will be developed that will help to take the cycle out
of state and local surpluses and deficits—perhaps, for example, promptly
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and markedly flexible grant-in-aid programs. Quite conceivably such
intergovernment flows that vary in volume with the cycle may presently
make any considerable amount of depression borrowing—except perhaps
for borrowing from the federal government—an extremely unlikely
development. But this prospect is hardly an immediate one.
During the decade of the 1930's the federal net debt increased by $16
billion, the federal loan and security portfolio by $9 billion. We think
that even a minor recession might in future entail a comparable net debt
increase. If the federal government should assume a fuller responsibility
for keeping the economy operating at a high and stable employment level,
this would make such a debt increase all the more likely, particularly if
the federal government should come to rely more heavily on a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy in discharging this increased responsibility. Also,
such a debt increase during a minor recession would become more likely
if the federal government were to assume something like the whole coun-
tercyclical deficit burden for all levels of government through some system
of cyclically flexible intergovernment nonfinancial flows of funds.
In this latter connection we note that during fiscal 1958 and 1959 the
federal government's nonfinancial deficit totaled $11 billion. But pre-
sumably this deficit would have been larger had there not been a pre-
recession nonfinancial surplus of $11 billion in calendar 1955 and 1956.
The size of the deficit incurred during the lower stages of a cycle—and of
the increment in net debt—must obviously depend in part on whether
the federal government has been operating at a deficit before the recession
began.
On one assumption these comments, with appropriate modifications,
would seem to apply also to the possibility of a severe and prolonged
business contraction. We think net debt might increase by a number of
times $16 billion. Also that the amount of federal credit extended to
promote recovery and relieve financial distress might be considerably more
than $9 billion. In this connection we should note that there were some
$40 billion of federally underwritten loans outstanding on June 30, 1954.
The likelihood of such federal debt and credit increases should be greater
the larger the responsibility assumed by the federal government for keeping
the economy operating at a high employment level—or for restoring it to a
high level—and the larger the extent to which it engages in a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. The likelihood should be greater, too, in proportion
as it assumes more fully the entire countercyclical deficit burden of all
levels of government. And in appraising the possible size of the deficit
we would need to consider whether the government sector's nonfinancial
transactions account was in balance when the contraction started.
But an assumption underlies these comments, and indeed also the
comments on the deficit prospects for minor recessions. It will doubtless
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be agreed that the deficit incurred would increase with the degree of the
business contraction that federal actions have to cope with. Yet we assume
that federal actions, including countercyclical operations that involve
running a deficit, can reduce the degree of contraction, even convert it
into a business upswing. If so, the degree of contraction attained at the
trough of the cycle and consequently the amount of the countercyclical
deficit depend upon how promptly and how vigorously the antirecession
actions are taken.
We noted that during the 1930's there was a conflict between the
objective of a balanced budget and the objective of an unwavering,
sizable fiscal countercycle. No doubt this conflict of objectives continues.
And, to the extent that it does, prompt and vigorous actions during the
early months of a cyclical downswing are made less likely. So are actions
that might involve a $16 billion nonfinancial deficit, especially if this
should mean a substantially larger budget deficit. It is easy to understand
why the prospect of such deficits would generate opposition to a counter-
cyclical program that involved tax cuts or works program and grant-in-
aid step-ups. The idea of alternating budget deficits and surpluses with
the downs and ups of the cycle so as to achieve a balance over the cycle
could only avoid opposition to such countercyclical actions if there were
some way to implement it. At present there are no fiscal procedures to
implement such a balance-over-the-cycle fiscal plan.
However, a capital budget system under which the additional counter-
cyclical works and grants expenditures during the lower phases of each
cycle would be charged to capital account and amortized over, say, the
next ten years would help to implement a balance-over-the-cycle fiscal
plan. And it is at least conceivable that a capital budget system could be
devised that would smooth the cycle out of budget receipts as well as
budget expenditures, so that, if the "smoothed" receipts balanced the
"smoothed" expenditures every year, the difference between the cumula-
tive total of "unsmoothed" budget receipts and that of "unsmoothed"
budget expenditures would have no secular trend either up or down.
Such a capital budget system would make prompt borrowing during a
recession more likely. But if it facilitated countercyclical action that proved
effective, it would not necessarily increase the total amount of recession
and depression borrowing.
What can be said about the prospects of future wartime borrowing is
necessarily entirely hypothetical, except that we can confidently predict
that state war-connected borrowing will be confined to financing veterans'
bonuses. Should there be another war, or other wars, the amount of
borrowing entailed would obviously depend on the size of the conflict or
conflicts. Federal net debt increased by about $175 billiOn during World
War II, but scarcely at all during the Korean War. Beyond this not a
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great deal can be said. It is reasonable to expect that the pay-for-more-of-
it-as-you-go trend would continue, but it would be extremely unlikely that
all or nearly all the cost of a major war would be met out of current
receipts. And of course wars have been getting more expensive and the
value of the dollar is less than it was in 1940.
These considerations regarding the prospects of wartime borrowing
and countercyclical borrowing do not by themselves throw much light on
the question whether the prospect is for an upward or conceivably for a
downward trend in federal net debt. This question is largely one of the
influences making for and against a program of debt retirement.
In Chapter VIII we concluded that such retirement of emergency-
incurred federal debt as has occurred seems for the most part to have been
inadvertent. And we noted that a program of retiring the existing federal
net debt would be likely to arouse both special interest group opposition
and a more general opposition to the cyclically depressing influence the
inauguration of such a program would entail.
Inadvertent debt retirement has been possible in the twentieth century
as it was in the nineteenth. Thus the tax cuts during the 1920's were so
slow they did not prevent a decade of surpluses. But, since income taxes
have replaced customs duties as the main revenue source, it has become
less likely. And the same considerations that make it improbable that any
substantial part of existing federal net debt will be retired make it probable
that, in the absence of fiscal procedures which might prevent such a
cumulative tendency, future business cycles will often add to the net debt
total.
We do have one such fiscal procedure now—the exclusion of social
insurance fund transactions from budget receipts and expenditures.
Because of this exclusion the increment in net debt since 1937 has been
less than the cumulative budget deficit would otherwise have made it by
the amount of the growth in social insurance fund balances. That these
balances will Continue to grow is by no means certain. But if and insofar
as they do, the exclusion of social insurance funds will help to keep down
the net—but not the gross—federal debt.
Another possible development that could work in the same direction
is that of a federal capital budget system that not only would make an
annual provision for debt retirements to implement an approximate
balance-over-the-cycle program but would also include provisions to
implement a gradual retirement of at least all emergency debts incurred
after the inauguration of this capital budget system. In the absence of such
provisions the most likely prospect would appear to be a gradual accumula-
tion of emergency debts.
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